Bearing the Beyond: Women and the Limits of Language in Stanley Cavell — Page 3:
11 The key implication of this (often quoted) example is that accords and discourse in language are based on the players' willingness to engage each other. Thus, what makes the systematicity of language possible according to Cavell's reading of Wittgenstein is our capacity and willingness to follow each other's words. We can do this to the degree that — to use Cavell's expression — we are "attuned" to each other's sense of what can be said in a given context, of how this word in this situation can be considered as a natural extension of what we say in that context or of how this is an appropriate or inappropriate understanding of what you say. Linguistic attunement is therefore an instance of being attuned in a shared form of life, according to Wittgenstein. "So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false? — It is what human beings say that is true or false; and they agree in the language they use. That is not agreement in opinion but in form of life" (PI §241; emphases in the original). The fact that we are attuned in our understanding what can "naturally" or "humanly" be said or doubted reflects, as Wittgenstein writes in §325, "how we think and live."
12 "How we think and live" is however not simply given either — nor is there a stable set of behaviors and thought patterns that identify "how we think and live." Rather, like playing ball together, thinking and living together is an ongoing process; and (unlike playing ball) it is a risky activity. What is remarkable about our use of language is how easily we can and do follow naturally the invitations expressed in new stories, in new jokes, etc. This speaks to the fact of how much we are in tune with each other. What is worrisome, and should be according to Cavell at least, is that any such invitation to follow can be refused. Sometimes projections that seem natural to us are utterly outrageous to others and we realize that we are not in tune with each other. "We begin to feel, or ought to, terrified that maybe language (and understanding, and knowledge) rests upon very shaky foundations — a thin net over an abyss" (Cavell, Claim 178).
13 What does this mean for the Wittgensteinan idea of a language game, which has such a hold on the imagination of many of his readers? Do language games provide a clear set of rules that perfectly govern the use of words? Given that Wittgenstein resists the idea of seeing rules as perspicuous representation of how we use words we need to tread carefully here. The function of language-games should not be pictured as being like the function of a computer-chip somewhere implanted in our brains, filled with algorithms for potential moves for the game it governs. Rather, language games are methods of description that Wittgenstein uses in dialogue with the philosopher. They are methodological inventions aimed at solving not abstract issues of grammar but particular concrete problems about which we find ourselves to be confused. Remember the ball-game. The revelers play some existing game without finishing, and then play parts of another. In describing a strip of behavior we may invoke "football" or "soccer" and we may say that this move is "like playing soccer," etc. We imagine connections, similarities and dissimilarities in order to clarify what is going on. Yet, there is a difference between saying that "this is what is going on" and claiming that "this is all that is going on" or that "this is the only way of describing what is going on." Whether you do agree with me that this way of describing things is appropriate cannot be settled by rules. I can only try to tell you how it strikes me thus. I can tell a story or relate to you my impressions. The invention of language-games is part of the methodological procedures by which I show you how this or that use of my words seems natural to me. I am leading you from one example to another. By showing you how this is natural to me I am appealing to you that you understand or consider these connections to be natural, as well. As Cavell writes in The Claim of Reason:
The philosophical appeal to what we say, and the search for our criteria on the basis of which we say what we say, are claims to community. And the claim to community is always a search for the basis upon which it can or has been established. I have nothing more to go on than my conviction, my sense that I made sense. It may prove to be the case that I am wrong, that my conviction isolates me from others, from all others, from myself [. . .]. The wish and search for community are the wish and search for reason. (20)
14 This picture provokes the question of who are "we" here? It may be tempting to invoke the concept of "form of life." The players in questions are those who belong to the "same form of life" and who are socialized, perhaps, in the same ways of using language, in the same standards of appropriateness or of esthetic tastes etc. Yet, a closer look reveals that Wittgenstein invokes "form(s) of life" or "what we do" in his Philosophical Investigations mostly in contexts of contestations. Martians may see the man as back-sliding, but "we" cannot help but see him as climbing the steep hill. References to what "we" do are not so much explanations for our actions but rather exhortations or appeals to being in community. If you cannot help but see the world in terms of mereological sums; or human beings as sacks of flesh governed by a universal consciousness; if you cannot see how "this" is being in pain, my words come to an end. I cannot explain but only claim that "this" is pain, or that bodies do matter. The form of live, which we share or contest, serves as a reference point that comes to existence only in the process of our appealing to it. As such, forms of life do not refer to existing demarcated spheres of behavior or experience. Appealing to a "form of life" is a claim to being intelligible and thus to being in community. Such appeals do not necessarily settle the question of any specific disagreement, but they transform a linguistic question into a negotiation of community.
15 Appeals to what "we" say are not so much reference to any existing communality but they constitute negotiations and performative creations of community. Again, it is helpful to stay close to the picture of the ball-game. It is through playing that we keep the ball going around. In other words, it is the interaction in words and life that establishes the reach of language, i.e., the circle of those to whom we talk and whose words we hear. Failed or contested interactions bring to the fore the questions of "what are we playing here" or "weren't we playing this game and not that one." Yet, it would be a mistake to see contestation and negotiation only at play when we have no resort but to assert the legitimacy of our practice in statements like "well, this is how we do things." Rather, we negotiate the reach of our community through the very acts of speaking, avoiding speech, silencing, and listening.