Off Centre.

26 As I have tried to show, the underlying distinctly human phenomenon throughout Plessner’s theory is the ability to take a step back from the immediate situation and thereby to observe oneself. This phenomenon, the ability of self-awareness or self-reflection, is widely regarded to be a central feature of human existence, in Plessner’s times as well as in contemporary anthropology, social sciences and philosophy. In fact, the two other prominent exponents of early 20th-century Philosophical Anthropology, Max Scheler and Arnold Gehlen, use similar points of departure for their respective theories. Since we are still looking for an answer to the question in what way the eccentric person differs from the non-eccentric with regard to fundamental attitudes towards life, we might be able to find an answer by looking into this prominent phenomenon of human existence.

27 In The View from Nowhere (1986), Thomas Nagel, an important contemporary American philosopher, tries to give content to the idea that the ability to take a step back not only is distinctly human, but also the root of many of our most pressing persistent philosophical problems. Nagel opens his book by saying:

This book is about a single problem: how to combine the perspective of a particular person inside the world with an objective view of that same world, the person and his viewpoint included. It is a problem that faces every creature with the impulse and the capacity to transcend its particular point of view and to conceive of the world as a whole. (3)

28 The parallels to Plessner’s theory are obvious. Both regard this capacity to transcend the particular point of view as crucial. Nagel clarifies this idea by introducing his concept of two different points of view: the subjective and the objective viewpoint. Nagel’s basic idea is that humans gain (scientific) knowledge by objectifying their viewpoint. We start with the subjective viewpoint in which “I” is the centre of the world. By means of objectification, the “I” then takes a step back and views herself as just one being among others, of no special significance.[5]Note that this corresponds to the dual aspect Plessner detects in the Außenwelt: The experience of my body as my own body (Leib) and, at the same time, as just an object among others (Körperding). According to Nagel, this process is how we make sense of the world (15-6). We try to eliminate subjective features and aim at a conception of the world that is as objective as possible because we think that this captures the true nature of reality.

29 However, at some point we get into trouble. While we may form a view of the world that is more and more objective, it is always us forming this viewpoint, which in effect means that the subjective element in all objective conceptions is ultimately irreducible. Nagel’s overall point in his book is the attempt to show that this irresolvable tension between the subjective and objective viewpoint is present in all of our reasoning concerning the world and ourselves.[6]An easy example is our attitude towards death. From the objective viewpoint, it is perfectly conceivable that, since we are a living organism, we will have to die at some point in time, just like every other creature does. However, from the subjective perspective, our own death is simply not conceivable, since here the “I” is the centre of the world (Nagel, chapter XI). Thus, what Plessner calls eccentric positionality matches with Nagel’s description of the irresolvable ever present tension between the subjective and the objective viewpoint.[7]Notice the ingenious title of Thomas Nagel’s book: The View from Nowhere of course refers to the objective viewpoint, but read as The View from Now Here additionally refers to the subjective viewpoint.

30 If we follow Nagel (138-188), this phenomenon allows for the following picture of how we form attitudes towards life. We have two different sources of information, the subjective and the objective viewpoint. According to the subjective viewpoint, we are the centre of our world; the “I” is the only thing that matters. However, according to the objective viewpoint we are just one entity among many others to which no special significance is attached. Thus, from the two viewpoints stem very different kinds of values. The reasons (for action) coming from the subjective viewpoint are all aiming at my personal good. In philosophy, they are commonly called prudential reasons. The reasons from the objective viewpoint are altruistic reasons, since they stem from the recognition that there are many individuals none of whom is more important than anyone else. The first kind of reasons has as its source solely our own interests, whereas the latter has as its source, in a very general way, the values of the society we live in, namely the values taken as a point of reference, even if controversially, by the members of a given community (i.e. Plessner’s Mitwelt). It seems to me that this model catches our intuitive idea about valuing quite well: we value everything around us with a mixture of such reasons which aim at promoting our own good and such which take into consideration moral values or the values of the society we live in.